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Abstract 
This paper studies environmental norm contestation in Cambodia’s hydropower sector, 
exemplified by the Kamchay Dam. In Cambodia we can observe different discourses 
in relation to hydropower. These stem directly from a local contest over the path of 
Cambodia’s development, but use global norms as reference points: one emphasizes 
environmental protection, using EIA as point of reference; and one emphasizes the 
utility of CDM to attract large-scale investment into the energy sector while 
downplaying the need for environmental protection. While EIA and CDM are 
complementary, key actors present them as contradictory. This produces a normative 
fragmentation of the field of environmental protection. The article argues that the 
norm diffusion literature, by presenting norm conflicts as hierarchical local-global 
conflicts, has paid insufficient attention to the fact that local actors actively draw on 
global norms to justify domestic development policies. More emphasis on this 
phenomenon will lead to a better understanding of the role of global norms in 
domestic politics and will enhance our knowledge of how domestic development 
policies are contested. 
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Introduction 
Norms, according to Finnemore (1996: 22), are ‘shared expectations about 
appropriate behaviour held by a community of actors.’ Norm diffusion is the process 
by which norms from one community of actors diffuse to another (Risse and Sikkink 
1999; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). The result is that communities around the world 
are drawn into a global normative mainstream as defined by dominant countries. In 
the context of the current system of international development, such norms are 
manifest in the policies of international organizations, most importantly the 
multilateral lending agencies (World Bank, International Monetary Fund), and of the 
donor countries of the developed North. 
 
For roughly a decade, the concept of norm diffusion has been accompanied by the 
idea of norm localization: The idea is that an international norm does not simply 
diffuse, but it encounters local norms with which it interacts (Acharya 2004; Acharya 
2009). On the local level, we can therefore observe multiple and simultaneous 
processes of norm contestation: within the local level, and between the local and the 
international level at the point where the international norm begins to engage with a 
local norm formation process. Norm formation and contestation therefore occur 
within a multi-level governance setting.  
 
Developing this argument further, this paper contributes to the literature on norm 
diffusion and contestation by showing that norm contestation does not simply occur 
on a hierarchical global-local axis. Instead, norm contestation needs to be understood 
as a genuinely local process in which global norms are actively drawn on by actors in 
developing countries to justify domestic development policies. In order to 
operationalize this analytical angle, the paper proposes to link the norm diffusion and 
contestation literature with the literature on competing institutional logics and field 
norms. This opens a perspective of how norms affect domestic institutions and how 
competing field norms affect policy making where organizational fields are highly 
fragmented. Therefore, a link between both sets of literature enables us to gain a 
clearer picture of how norm contestation occurs beyond the hierarchical notion of 
norm conflicts. 
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This paper develops this argument by studying norm contestation in Cambodia’s 
hydropower sector. The issue area under investigation is environmental protection, 
focussing on two global norms: Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and their role in environmental planning for 
the Kamchay hydroelectric dam. The Kamchay Dam is the first large dam in 
Cambodia and therefore provides a test case for the relevance of Cambodia’s 
environmental protection institutions and their role in structuring the normative 
landscape in Cambodia.  
 
The article begins with a theoretical discussion of the processes of norm diffusion and 
contestation, proposing a stronger focus on the national level by using the concept of 
competing institutional logics in order to better understand how norm contestation 
occurs. This is followed by an account of how EIA and CDM were introduced into 
Cambodia, after which follows an analysis of Cambodia’s hydropower discourse and 
an examination of the planning process for the Kamchay Dam. Data comes from field 
work conducted in Cambodia in September 2010 (updated via email communication 
in April 2012). Field work consisted of collecting relevant documents, and of 
conducting semi-structured interviews with independent consultants, NGO personnel, 
workers from the Kamchay construction site, local councillors in the area of the 
Kamchay Dam, foreign embassy officials, and government officials in the Ministries 
of Environment; Industry, Mines and Energy; Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; and 
the Cambodian Investment Board.  
 
The rationale for selecting government interviewees were their direct involvement in 
legal development and in hydropower decision-making processes. The rationale for 
selecting NGOs and independent consultants were their involvement in advocacy and 
research into dam issues on the ground. The rationale for interviewing local 
councillors and workers at the construction site was an assessment of the effects of the 
dam on the surrounding villages. Foreign embassy officials were interviewed in order 
to obtain their view on the effects of official development assistance on Cambodia’s 
political system.  
 
All interviews were held in English, and where necessary were conducted with the 
assistance of an interpreter. Given the politically sensitive nature of the topic in 
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Cambodia, all interviewees were assured of anonymity. The interviews are therefore 
coded, with the first letter indicating the place of interview and the sequence of 
numbers indicating the date.  
 
Local norm contests and the problem of global-local norm diffusion  
The literature provides different answers to the question of how norms can be 
perceived and interpreted. In constructivist accounts of norm diffusion, spearheaded 
by Finnemore (1996), norms are shared systems of belief that influence behaviour. 
This is challenged by scholars, who believe that the process of choosing norms is a 
political rather than a constructivist process. Rationalist accounts of norm acceptance 
contest that elites make a rational decision when deciding which norms to use by 
recalculating their strategies (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). Similarly, Cortell and 
Davis (1996) argue that when confronted with international norms, actors recalculate 
their strategic choices in order to gain legitimacy in domestic policy debates. This is 
akin to Checkel (1997) who suggests that whether elites internalize or merely utilize 
international norms depends on the nature of the domestic political institutions, that is, 
on the structure of state-society relations.  
 
Looking at accounts of how norms spread, the early norm diffusion literature 
identified a number of pathways through which norms diffuse. Burnell (1997) shows 
how donors built policy preferences for good governance into the aid architecture and 
presented these as conditionalities to aid receivers. Keck and Sikkink (1998) 
developed the boomerang model to show how NGOs from developed countries exert 
pressure on their governments to force governments from developing countries into 
acceptance of higher standards of appropriate behaviour. Risse and Sikkink’s (1999) 
five-phase spiral model explained variation in internalization of human rights by elites, 
arguing that internalization must be accompanied by domestic political transition, a 
process that includes recurring feedback loops. The spiral model views domestic 
institutions as intervening variables.  
 
While the focus on the domestic arena is a step forward from the earlier diffusion 
literature, the emphasis is still on the role of global actors to diffuse global norms and 
enforce compliance by local actors. Acharya (2004; 2009) developed this agenda 
further by focussing on localization. Examining norm developments in East and 
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Southeast Asia, he argues that developing countries are not mere norm receivers. On 
the contrary, global norms encounter local norms, and the interaction of the global 
norm with a local ‘cognitive prior’ leads to a process of localization by which local 
norm receivers translate the global norm to make it fit with their cultural situation. 
Similarly, Santa-Cruz’s (2009) work on election monitoring in Mexico shows how 
local actors reinterpreted global norms around sovereignty and non-intervention as 
they developed an election monitoring policy in cooperation with international actors.  
 
This more recent work gives legitimacy to local norms and breaks through the 
distinction of superior and inferior norms as viewed from the dominant country 
perspective. In a further development, Santos and Rodrigues-Garavito (2005) turned 
the pathways of norm diffusion upside down. Looking at Latin America, they showed 
that countries from the global South also influence global norms and that, therefore, 
norms also operate bottom-up.  
 
Despite these advances in the literature, there is a continuing focus on the global-local 
dichotomy. Therefore, the global level remains dominant to the analysis or at least 
casts its shadow on local politics as an actively intervening structure. This presents 
developing countries as being reactive to global pressures and developments. The 
literature has paid insufficient attention to the issue that global norms are also actively 
used by local actors in developing countries to justify a development discourse to a 
domestic audience. Rather than intervening in domestic politics, global norms here 
function as sources of knowledge or points of reference: They may be used by 
domestic actors to construct development policies and back up their arguments, and 
domestic actors may enforce their message by striking alliances with global actors to 
increase the legitimacy of their claims.  
 
The paper addresses these omissions. It argues that in order to understand norm 
dynamics we need to move away from an emphasis on the hierarchical view of norm 
contestation and instead focus on how local actors frame domestic policy debates and 
construct policies by referring to global norms. This enhances our understanding of 
local communities as actors engaged in a normative conflict in which competing 
discourses shape the construction of public policies. Gregg (2009: 19-36) argued that 
 6 
norms are generic. Therefore, in order to understand the role of global norms in local 
politics, an emphasis on the local level of analysis is necessary.  
 
I propose to link this emphasis on the local level of norm contestation with the 
literature on competing institutional logics. This is important to the article’s theme, 
because competing logics can facilitate or impede the introduction and 
implementation of development policies (Hayes and Rajão 2011) as the meaning of 
development – and sustainable development – is contested (Banerjee 2003). An 
examination of competing logics allows observing dynamics of norm contestation 
between and within constituent communities of an organizational field (Swan et al. 
2010). Both dynamics interact in that the normative contest between organizations 
influences the effectiveness of individual organizations and, potentially, how the 
organization positions itself in the field in order to effectively project its norms in the 
policy process. Conversely, intra-organizational dynamics can influence policy 
outcomes. This article focuses predominantly on inter-organizational norm dynamics 
and to a lesser extent on intra-organizational dynamics. For reasons of space, the 
article cannot examine the strategies of organizations for overcoming fragmentation.
1
 
 
An organizational field is defined as ‘a community of actors held together by their 
joint values and beliefs’ (Scott 2008 quoted in Reay and Hinings 2009: 631). Where a 
field is normatively fragmented, we face a multiplicity of institutional logics 
(Greenwood et al. 2010) that may compete with each other. For example, analyzing 
the contest over a paper mill in Canada, Vit (2011) argues that although the mill was 
never economically or technically feasible and eventually failed, proponents were 
driven by normative and social logics that initially overrode technical logics. 
Generally speaking, competition between logics can have four outcomes: 
displacement, co-existence, field fragmentation, or transformation of existing logics 
(Mullins 2006). To deal with complexity, actors can also hijack each other’s logics 
(McPherson and Sauder 2013). Competition might also be resolved through micro-
level cooperation between actors of different normative beliefs (Reay and Hinings 
2009). But cooperation is difficult in politicized societies and semi-authoritarian 
governance systems such as we find in Cambodia where institutional weakness leads 
to a lack of regularized conflict resolution mechanisms (Hughes et al. 2004: 104; 
Springer 2005). Where competing logics exist within individual organizations, the 
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result can be hybrid organizations (Battilana and Dorado 2010; Greenwood et al. 
2011). This can happen, for example, when organizations are exposed to different 
logics during long periods of time (Lounsbury 2007). Harking back to the early 
institutionalization literature, this is reminiscent of Selznik’s (1949; 1957) view of an 
institution whose agenda is affected by the values of actors inside and outside of it. As 
an organization becomes institutionalized, it becomes ‘infuse[d] with value beyond 
the technical requirements of the task at hand’ (1957: 17). The values of an institution 
are therefore reflective of the norms that relevant actors embody over time. The power 
balance between actors in the institution determines what values it projects 
(Stinchcombe 1968). Accordingly, the power distribution between different 
institutions in the decision-making process determines the relevance of an institution’s 
values for government policy.  
 
As we shall see, the environmental contest over the Kamchay Dam is embedded in a 
wider contest about the nature and future trajectory of Cambodia’s development and 
the role of the environmental protection institutions therein. Environmental conflicts 
should be understood as local conflicts about the nature of the state. They revolve 
around the degree to which development interventions designed by the central 
government – such as large dams – should be allowed to disrupt local social-
ecological systems
2
, and if and how local communities affected by this disruption 
should be allowed to participate in decision-making and thus potentially challenge 
government policies. Therefore, environmental norm contestation is better understood 
along the lines of Paavola’s (2007: 94) suggestion of environmental governance as 
‘the establishment, reaffirmation or change of institutions to resolve conflicts over 
environmental resources’.   
 
In Cambodia, the conflict is played out between domestic actors who use two global 
environmental norms – CDM and EIA – to frame the debates and construct contrary 
development paradigms. While CDM and EIA are complementary, they are styled by 
leading actors as mutually exclusive. The field of environmental protection therefore 
becomes normatively fragmented. This influences the role and effectiveness of the 
Ministry of Environment (MoE), which is the approval organization for EIA and 
CDM applications. 
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The paper views environmental conflicts as occurring within a fragmented field rather 
than on a hierarchical local-global axis. It examines domestic actors in the 
hydropower decision-making process, their normative backgrounds, key discursive 
elements, and global reference points to understand how environmental norm 
contestation occurs and what the role of global norms is within this contest. The next 
sections examine the evolution and the contents of environmental norm contestation 
in Cambodia.  
 
The evolution of Cambodia’s environmental protection institutions: EIA, CDM, 
and the emergence of normative fragmentation  
Cambodia’s EIA framework is based on two technical assistance (TA) programmes, 
extended by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1995 and 1997. The result was 
an EIA regime that – according to the law – applies to virtually all hydropower 
projects.  
 
The first TA, number 24780, was carried out between 1995 and 1997 with the aim to 
put in place EIA procedures and capabilities in post-civil war Cambodia (ADB 1994). 
At the time, the first post-civil war government had a basic environmental protection 
bureaucracy in place, including an Inter-Ministerial Committee, an Environmental 
Evaluation Commission, and an Environment Secretariat (ADB 1994: 1), which was 
later upgraded to the MoE. The TA was based on an ADB fact finding mission in 
November 1993, only a few months after the first post-war elections had taken place 
in July of that year.   
 
The role of the TA was to devise an environmental planning system for all stages of 
the EIA cycle, including Initial and Full EIA studies, and monitoring of 
environmental management plans during project implementation (ADB 1994: 2-3). 
Coordination occurred with Canada’s International Development Research Centre, 
which had established an office at the Environment Secretariat to coordinate 
environment-related aid; and with UNDP, which had an Environment Advisory Team 
at the Environment Secretariat to assist in the creation of environmental legislation 
(ADB 1994: 1). During the time of the first TA, the National Assembly passed the 
Law on Environmental Protection and Natural Resources Management, which made 
EIA a legal requirement (Royal Government of Cambodia 1996). 
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The second TA, number 9283, was carried out between 1997 and 1999 to strengthen 
institutional capacity for EIA (ADB 1996: 1). The result of both TAs was the setting 
up of the Department for Environmental Impact Assessment Review (henceforth: EIA 
Department) in the MoE, the drafting of a Sub-decree on Environmental Impact 
Assessment Process as implementation instrument for the EIA provisions in the 1996 
Law on Environmental Protection and Natural Resources Management, and the 
development of EIA sector guidelines as well as standards for air, water and soil 
(ADB 1999; ADB 1996: 2).  
 
The Sub-decree on Environmental Impact Assessment Process came into effect in 
1999. The Annex of the Sub-decree stipulates that all hydropower plants of more than 
1 megawatt (MW) installed capacity must undergo EIA (Royal Government of 
Cambodia 1999). Article 3 of the Sub-decree states that the project owner must 
comply with an environmental management plan during the phase of construction.  
 
The next piece of EIA regulation came into effect only ten years later: the 2009 
Prakas on General Guideline for Conducting Initial and Full Environmental Impact 
Assessment Reports. The Prakas details the previous legislation regarding content and 
procedures for EIA. The Annex of the Prakas lays down a structure for the EIA report, 
which must contain, inter alia, a description of public participation, of the 
environmental impact and mitigation measures, and of the environmental 
management plan (Royal Government of Cambodia 2009). Article 15 of the Prakas 
requires the project owner to set up an environmental endowment fund to pay for 
environmental protection measures (ibid.). However, all three documents are very 
general and contain no specific proscriptions regarding forms of public participation 
or the precise content of the environmental management plan (Interview P07092010).  
 
The institution in charge of determining the need of EIA for hydropower projects and 
for approving EIA reports is the EIA Department. Having approved an EIA, the EIA 
Department sends its decision to the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy (MIME), 
the ministry responsible for energy policy and the institution that has the final say 
over energy projects. Within MIME, the General Department of Energy is in charge 
of energy planning. Within the General Department of Energy, the Hydropower 
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Department is in charge of hydropower planning. Legally, MIME has to await the 
decision of the EIA Department before granting final project approval for energy 
projects.  
 
Following ADB practice, the EIA Department distinguishes between Initial and Full 
EIAs. Project owners are first required to submit Initial EIAs together with an initial 
environmental management plan. If the EIA Department concludes that the impacts 
are severe, the project owner is required to submit a Full EIA report and a full 
environmental management plan (Royal Government of Cambodia 2009). Article 29 
of the 1999 Sub-decree and the 2009 Prakas allow the MoE to punish non-compliance 
with the environmental management plans by levying a fine (Royal Government of 
Cambodia 1999 and 2009). Article 4 of the Prakas stipulates that the EIA Department 
will monitor the company’s adherence to the environmental management plan (Royal 
Government of Cambodia 2009). However, in interviews held during September 2010, 
MIME acknowledged that technical and personnel capacities in the government to 
monitor company activities are very limited.   
 
This concurs with an ADB assessment at the time of the first TA, which pointed out a 
lack of ‘managerial skills and experience’ (ADB 1996: 2). The ADB further 
emphasized a lack of ‘political’ support for environmental protection (ibid.: 1) 
because of the ‘reluctance of senior Government officials to delegate power and 
authority’ (ibid.: 3). Similarly, Sokhem and Sunada (2006) argue that Cambodia’s 
weak EIA institutions are a result of ‘[s]trong resistance by powerful and elite persons 
to reform’, patronage, political deadlock, corruption, nepotism, intimidation, and 
complex financial interests (for in depth analyses on the link between patronage and 
natural resources see Le Billon 2000; Sneddon 2007; Un and So 2009. For an 
overview of Cambodia’s neo-patrimonialism see Pak et al. 2007). Relevant examples 
in the dam industry include Lao Meng Khin, a senator for the ruling Cambodian 
People’s Party and owner of several development companies. Company registration 
documents show him on the Board of Directors of Sinohydro Cambodia, the company 
associated with the Kamchay Dam. During the opening ceremony for the Kamchay 
Dam, Hun Sen awarded the senator a medal for his contributions to Cambodia’s 
development (Caminfoweb 2012). Similarly, the Lower Sesan 2 Dam is built by 
Hydrolancang in cooperation with Kith Meng’s Royal Group. Political interests in the 
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hydropower sector are therefore interwoven with economic interests of Cambodia’s 
oligarchs, making it difficult for the environmental bureaucracy to enforce EIA rules. 
Regarding CDM, Cambodia as non-Annex I country has no obligations under the 
Kyoto Protocol but can host CDM projects. To build institutional capacity, Cambodia 
received assistance from UNDP and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) for the 
first climate change project: The 1999 Climate Change Enabling Activity Project. 
Further assistance came from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
Risoe Centre to implement the 2002-2003 Capacity Development for the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CD4CDM). Complementing CD4CDM, Japan’s Institute 
for Global Environmental Studies funded the Integrated Capacity Strengthening 
project (Ministry of Environment, no date_a; Tin et al. 2004: 20; De Lopez 2003: 34-
35). 
 
Cambodia’s involvement began when it ratified the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in December 1995 and the Kyoto 
Protocol in August 2002. Prime Minister Hun Sen appointed the MoE as Designated 
National Authority (DNA). In June 2003 the Climate Change Department was 
established in the MoE to act as Secretariat to the DNA (Ministry of Environment, no 
date_a). In April 2006, the National Climate Change Committee was established to 
monitor UNFCCC implementation, to formulate, coordinate and implement relevant 
government policies, and to manage the CDM mechanism (Ministry of Environment, 
no date_b). It is chaired by the Minister of Environment, but is otherwise an inter-
ministerial committee, whereby the vice-chairmen are secretaries of state from the 
Ministries of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; Industry, Mines and Energy; Water 
Resources and Meteorology; and Commerce. The remaining ministries are 
represented by under-secretaries of state and are only members (Ministry of 
Environment, no date_c). The Climate Change Department acts as secretariat to the 
Committee. It therefore has no independent organizational capacity. Given the 
Committee’s cross-ministerial nature, policies represent a compromise between the 
key ministries.  
 
However, the Climate Change Department approves national CDM projects. Before 
issuing a Letter of Approval, it checks CDM proposals against a list of sustainability 
criteria that were established in cooperation between the MoE and MIME and 
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therefore also represent a compromise. Based on national development targets and 
sector policies, the sustainability criteria are grouped into four categories, each 
containing a number of indicators: environmental protection and mitigation, social 
enhancement of income and quality of life, technology transfer, and economic 
benefits. Projects are not allowed to score negative for any indicator in any of the 
categories. If a project scores negative, the developer has to redesign the project and 
reapply to the Climate Change Department. 
Legally EIA is an integrated part of the CDM process. In order to apply for a CDM 
project, the company must comply with Cambodia’s Law on Investment, the Law on 
Environmental Protection and Natural Resources Management, and with the EIA 
requirements. As a consequence, a violation of EIA regulations is also a violation of 
the approval criteria for CDM projects.  
 
As a result, the MoE is the institution for the domestic operationalization of both 
global environmental norms: EIA and CDM. As recognition of compliance by project 
companies with both also rests with the Ministry, we should expect one of two things: 
a normative conflict within the ministry in which the EIA Department and the Climate 
Change Department pursue the operationalization of competing environmental norms; 
or an integration of CDM and EIA processes and therefore the close cooperation 
between the EIA Department and the Climate Change Department. We will now 
examine this problem by looking at the key components of the hydropower 
development discourse and the role of EIA and CDM within it. 
 
Hydropower in Cambodia’s development discourse 
Hydropower development in Cambodia is situated within the discourse on domestic 
economic development. In 1991 Cambodia emerged from two and half decades of 
internationalized civil war with little good physical infrastructure such as roads and 
rails or reliable electricity production and transmission systems. The competition over 
hydropower is therefore a contest about the type of development that Cambodia 
should undergo.  
 
Cambodia’s development discourse has three core aspects: a lack of power supply; the 
creation of a liberal investment regime to attract foreign investment; and the role the 
environmental protection institutions should play in this development.  
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The Kamchay Dam is Cambodia’s first large hydropower dam. It has been running at 
full capacity of 194 MW since December 2011. Before that, installed capacity in 
Cambodia was 600MW, of which 23MW were supplied by hydropower stations, and 
the rest by diesel generators, heavy fuel oil, and electricity imports from Vietnam, 
Thailand and Laos (Council for the Development of Cambodia 2010). Cambodia has 
no national electricity grid, and in 2011 only 23.5 per cent of the population had 
access to grid-based electricity (Hun Sen 2013). The situation is particularly 
problematic in the countryside, where people use diesel generators and car batteries 
for electricity production (Council for the Development of Cambodia 2010).  
 
The government’s central objective is to connect 70 per cent of Cambodia’s 
population to grid electricity by 2030, reduce electricity costs and avoid frequent 
power outages. To achieve this, MIME is implementing the Sustainable Electricity for 
All strategy (Hun Sen 2013). Prime Minister Hun Sen emphasized to meet this target 
with hydropower and coal (Hun Sen 2013). This is the core of the government’s 
understanding of sustainability. The sentiment is mirrored by Ith Prang, Secretary of 
the State of MIME. Speaking about the progress made by Huadian, the Chinese 
company that builds the Lower Russei Chrum Dam, he said: ‘We are trying to push 
the company to speed up and finish its construction so that power can be generated to 
respond to the power shortage in the country’ (Dyer and Chun 2010).  
 
As Cambodia does not have the financial or technical capacity to build and operate 
dams, it relies on foreign investment and on concessionary BOT projects. 
Interviewees in MIME pointed out that Cambodia ‘actively encourages private sector 
participation in BOT projects’ (Interview P10092010a). Liberal investment policies 
are designed to attract as much investment as possible. This includes tax holidays and 
free-of-charge licenses (for dams this includes Construction, Water Use, and 
Environment Licences) to keep investment costs low. The government guarantees the 
purchase of electricity, and it buys out the company in case of force majeure 
(Interview P10092010a; Royal Government of Cambodia 1994: Chapter V). 
 
The first energy development policy was developed by MIME in 1994: the National 
Energy Sector Development Policy stipulates general guidelines and aims without 
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specifying a particular technology (Williamson 2006: 249). This was followed by the 
Cambodia Power Sector Strategy 1999-2016 (Ministry of Industry and Mines 1999). 
It emphasizes the need for private investment in the power sector as the ‘huge growth 
in power supply and infrastructure requirements is not affordable by the Government’ 
(p. 4). The focus is almost exclusively on hydropower, placing Cambodia firmly in 
what a ‘hydraulic mission’ (Allan 2003: 6-11) in which governments view the 
development of water resources as key to economic development. 
 
The Cambodia Power Sector Strategy was based on a World Bank study that 
recommended hydropower and energy imports and dismissed the potential for 
renewable energies (Williamson 2006: 250-251). In 2003, the World Bank provided 
another assistance for a Renewable Electricity Action Plan (REAP). REAP suggested 
decentralized electricity systems using renewable energy including solar, biomass and 
micro-hydros (NGO Forum on Cambodia and Probe International 2009: 41-42).  
 
Regarding the apparent contradiction between the two World Bank projects, 
Williamson (2006: 254) argues that this is ‘more reflective of changing World Bank 
philosophy than any indication of a change in Cambodian government priorities’. 
During an interview in MIME in September 2010, an official emphasized that World 
Bank supports the government’s hydropower strategy. Indeed, the Hydropower 
National Sector Review (Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy and Cambodia 
National Mekong Committee 2003) outlines short, medium and long-term 
development plans arguing that ‘cheap electricity like hydropower combined with 
irrigation of large agricultural areas would justify the economic viability of dam 
projects’ (p. 14).  
 
In 2005, the government published the Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Employment, 
Equity and Efficiency, which provides the framework for the National Strategic 
Development Plan Update 2009-2013 (Royal Government of Cambodia 2010). The 
Update document mirrors the tone of the previous planning policies. It establishes six 
priority areas with environmental protection absent. The priority area Further 
Rehabilitation and Construction of Physical Infrastructure includes energy. Here, the 
document emphasizes the ‘priority to increase electricity supply capacity and reduce 
tariff to an appropriate level while strengthening institutional mechanism and 
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management capability. To this end, the Royal Government will encourage the 
construction of low cost electricity generating plants by using local energy sources 
such as hydro power, natural gas, and coal’ (p. 148).  
 
In 2012, the government published The Cambodian Government’s Achievements and 
Future Direction in Sustainable Development: National Report for Rio+20 (Ministry 
of Environment, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Planning 2012). The 
document emphasizes that ‘[h]ydropower is a cornerstone of Cambodia’s energy 
policy’ (p. 20) to meet rising electricity demand. But it clearly shows here the interest 
of the MoE, noting that hydropower is also a core part of the ‘green growth low 
carbon emission path with 68 percent of electricity generation in 2024 planned to be 
provided by hydro electric plants’. While mitigation options for climate change also 
include solar energy, biomass and energy efficiency initiatives, the carbon market 
plays an important role as an incentive for private sector investment into hydropower 
(p. 90). Outlining the multiple aims of hydropower, the document reflects the interests 
of MIME in low-cost energy and of the MoE in climate-friendly hydropower.  
 
 Potential and reality of CDM in Cambodia 
A study for Cambodia’s MoE and Japan’s Institute for Global and Environmental 
Strategies reports a technical potential of 18,868GWh per year, of which 37,668GWh 
would fall on hydropower, 18,852GWh on modern biomass, 6,591GWh on residential 
energy efficiency, 3,665GWh on wind, 547GWh on industrial energy efficiency, and 
65GWh on solar energy (Williamson et al. 2004: 22 Table 4). Together, this would 
equal a potential abatement of greenhouse gas emissions of 46,931 ktonCO2eq per 
year (ibid.). Jung (2006) argues that investment climate, emissions reduction potential, 
and functioning CDM institutions are determinants for the attractiveness of potential 
CDM host countries. She argues, somewhat problematically, that Cambodia is 
unlikely to generate any CDM projects although about USD1 million have gone into 
capacity-building (p. 2181 note 31). Yet, Cambodia currently hosts nine CDM 
projects, of which two are large hydropower projects. The other seven are mostly 
small-scale biogas and biomass projects. The Kamchay project is currently in 
validation stage (CDM Pipeline, downloaded 10 December 2013). There is therefore 
interest in developing both small-scale and large-scale CDM projects.  
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Although Least Developed Countries face hurdles in CDM investment as they have 
limited aggregate emissions on the national level, they have high potential for specific 
mitigation activities at the ‘enterprise, village, or household level’ (De Lopez et al. 
2009: 440, 437, 439). This is echoed by Buysman and Mol (2013: 45) who argue for 
Cambodia that biogas potential and benefits are ‘considerable’ as most households use 
traditional biomass for cooking.  
 
However, the government appears to have abandoned ‘opportunities to develop 
alternative resources to achieve electricity development goals in a sustainable and 
equitable manner’ (Poch 2013: 254). Apart from large hydropower, public funding for 
other renewable energy technologies – biomass, biofuel, biogas, solar energy, and 
wind energy – is entirely dependent on donor money, and there is little awareness of 
renewable energies among government agencies. Therefore ‘the government’s 
incentive schemes are disproportionately directed’ towards hydropower and coal-fired 
plants (p. 257). While the government offers payment guarantees for these, 
‘[i]ncentive schemes are not available for other types of RE [renewable energies] such 
as biomass and solar power’ (pp. 257-258). 
 
A challenge for attracting investment in non-hydropower renewables is the ‘high 
revenue potential of hydropower and the high cost of some other renewable energies’ 
(Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Planning 2012: 
21). MIME argues that other renewable technologies such as clean coal would yield 
prohibitively high electricity prices (Interview P10092010a). But simultaneously 
‘very little resource assessment or project identification work has been undertaken 
except for hydropower projects. This makes it difficult to develop a CDM project 
pipeline and promote projects to investors’ (Williamson et al. 2004: 45). 
 
This complicates the efforts of the Climate Change Department to develop small-scale 
technologies (Käkönen 2013: 50). Käkönen (2013: 50) observes that small-scale 
projects are developed in close communication with the Climate Change Department 
and have a direct positive effect on local livelihoods. In contrast, large-scale projects 
such as hydropower dams are developed by the project company with ‘minimal’ 
communication with the Department (ibid.) and benefit mostly Phnom Penh residents.  
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For NGOs, the introduction of EIA to Cambodia made the mechanism available as a 
source for a different discourse. Particularly the emerging NGO scene began to draw 
on this. Most importantly, the NGO Forum on Cambodia, an umbrella organisation, 
has created a counter-vision to the government’s energy strategy. In a report co-
authored with Probe International, the NGO Forum delegitimizes the pro-hydropower 
discourse. Drawing on the social and environmental effects and on cost and energy 
efficiency arguments, they argue that the idea of a centralized grid powered by 
hydropower and coal should be abandoned in favour of decentralized power 
generation close to consumers, including mini and micro hydros (NGO Forum on 
Cambodia and Probe International 2009: 56-96). This would have a better impact on 
poverty reduction and avoid the social and environmental effects of dams. These are 
exacerbated by the fact that hydropower is viable only in the mountainous areas of the 
Northeast and Southwest. Many of these areas are protected, and people’s livelihoods 
there are dependent on natural resources (ibid.; Grogan et al. 2009: 14).  
 
 EIA and CDM: contradictory or complementary?  
As Cambodia has developed a liberal investment regime and the highest political 
leadership in the person of Hun Sen and MIME support large hydropower, the EIA 
Department has faced difficulties with EIA implementation. Sam Chamreoun of the 
MoE argues that since the post-war period, the leadership has been occupied with 
building institutions for foreign investment and integration into the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations and the World Trade Organization, leaving little room to 
develop policies for water resources governance (Sam, no date – publication after 
November 2005: 7). Indeed, ‘the need for environmental assessment in Cambodia is 
still seen by several parties as being secondary to the need for development’ (p. 32). 
Such parties include ‘government ministries responsible for infrastructure or industrial 
and agricultural development’ (ibid.). The authority of the MoE to enforce EIA is 
therefore ‘limited’ (p. 31).  
 
During interviews, government officials expressed the view that if the MoE would 
require Full EIAs for all projects, potential investors might choose not to invest in 
Cambodia (Interviews P07092010, P20092010a). Officials from the Fisheries 
Department in the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries expressed 
frustration that by the time the Fisheries Department becomes involved in the EIA 
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process, the decision of building a dam has already been taken at the highest political 
level. As a consequence, the Fisheries Department can only suggest mitigation options 
but has no influence on whether these will be implemented (Interview P20092010b).  
 
Similarly, staff of the Climate Change Department feel powerless vis-à-vis large 
companies in ensuring that the promises of sustainability made in the Project Design 
Document (PDD) are met, and little opportunities exist for staff to hold project 
companies to account after the issuance of the Letter of Approval (Käkönen 2012: 54-
55). 
 
Furthermore, localities find it difficult to use tax and other policies for CDM projects 
that would benefit the local population: Käkönen (2013: 54) recounts negotiations of 
Stung Meanchey with private Korean, German and Italian companies to create a 
methane recovery project. As part of the project, the municipality expected to gain a 
share in the project or in the selling of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). This 
condition was cited as a reason for why the project failed. Accordingly, Department 
officials expressed their frustration that such policies are viewed as hurdle to foreign 
investment (p. 54). This mirrors precisely the argument against Full EIAs. 
 
The consequence is that while EIA and CDM are complementary mechanisms as far 
as the approval processes are concerned, they are presented as mutually exclusive by 
hydropower proponents. Furthermore, the leadership and MIME tend to focus on 
national level development and macro-economic policies, while the MoE tends to 
strike a balance between local livelihoods and national development objectives. This 
has implications for the emphasis on the need to conduct EIAs. All actors can also 
point to international support: while the NGO Forum on Cambodia draws on the 
support of Probe International, MIME cites World Bank support. The result is an 
internationalization of the normative contest in Cambodia, with the MoE in between. 
The next section analyzes how this is relevant in the decision-making process for the 
Kamchay Dam. 
 
Planning the Kamchay Dam 
The Kamchay Dam is located in the province of Kampot on the Kamchay River in 
Bokor National Park. Following the withdrawal of Japanese and Canadian companies 
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from the project on account of high costs and pressure by international environmental 
organisations (Malmquist and Sigfridsson 2002: 7; Labelle 1997), the Cambodian 
government held an international bidding contest between June 2004 and January 
2005. Companies from Cambodia, Korea, Japan and China submitted an offer. 
Sinohydro won the contest (International Rivers and Rivers Coalition in Cambodia 
2008: 19, 56; Sam 2007: 1; interview P10092010a). On 27 April 2005, MIME and 
Sinohydro signed the project contract (Sam 2007: 1).  
 
On 4 July 2005, during the Second Greater Mekong Subregion Summit, China’s 
Prime Minister Hu Jintao and Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen signed an 
agreement approving Sinohydro’s plan to build Kamchay (Sam 2007: 1). This meant 
that the investment decision was now taken at the highest level. The EIA Department 
approved the Initial EIA in October 2006 (Grimsditch 2012: 37; Interview 
P16092010). On 23 February 2006, MIME and the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
signed the build-operate-transfer (BOT) agreement with Sinohydro, and Sinohydro 
and Electricité du Cambodge signed the Power Purchase Agreement (Sinohydro 2008: 
5, 25). Kamchay supplies energy to the Phnom Penh grid through the Kampot 
Switching Station (Sinohydro 2013: 2).  
 
Sinohydro built and operates the dam under a 44-year concession agreement. China 
Exim Bank provided Sinohydro with a loan (Interview P10092010a). The Kamchay 
investment with a sum of US$280 million was the largest foreign invested project in 
Cambodia at the time. In line with the liberal investment law, the government granted 
Sinohydro tax-free import of equipment, tax holidays, and the option to renew the 
concession period if the government is unable to operate the dam (Interview 
P08092010). All licences were granted free of charge (Interview P09102010a). 
 
 The role of EIA and CDM 
Following the EIA Department’s approval of the Initial EIA, construction commenced 
in September 2007 (Xinhua 2011). The first turbine began to produce electricity in 
December 2009. Yet, the EIA Department approved the Full EIA only in October 
2011, two months before the Kamchay Dam became fully operational (International 
Rivers 2012). The Full EIA was thus approved four years after construction had 
commenced. This meant that the full environmental management plan remained 
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unknown to the public for the entire period of construction, although people were 
affected by the construction process (Grimsditch 2012: 38). 
 
Sinohydro first considered a CDM application at a board of directors meeting on 18 
February 2007 when the financial assessment produced an internal rate of return that 
would not make the dam financially viable (Sinohydro 2011: 17 Table B.2). From 22 
October 2008 to 20 November 2008 the PDD (Version 01) was published on the 
UNFCCC website 
(http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/Validation/DB/SZMYEKN22NBGRL9K2T27WX22O
9Z8US/view.html) for the Global Stakeholder Process, but no comments were 
received. The Climate Change Department issued the Letter of Approval on 20 
November 2008 (Ministry of Environment 2008).  
 
In March 2010, International Rivers submitted a comment to the CDM Executive 
Board and Jirote Na Nakorn, Managing Director of SGS, the CDM validator for 
Kamchay. The comments focussed on three issues. First, a lack of additionality: 
Kamchay would be built also without CDM validation, and at the time of application 
had already attracted funding by China Exim Bank and site preparation was well 
under way. Second, a lack of transparency: the closed-door negotiations between 
Chinese and Cambodian government officials and the refusal to submit the project 
contract to the National Assembly when it voted on the financial guarantees. Third, 
environmental and social impacts on Bokor National Park and the affected local 
communities, inadequate information dissemination and public consultations, and the 
absence of a Full EIA before construction which renders Kamchay in breach of EIA 
rules (International Rivers 2010).  
 
When Sinohydro reapplied for CDM in December 2011 following the temporary 
suspension of SGS by the CDM Executive Board (CDM Executive Board 2009a: 
Annex 2; CDM Executive Board 2009b: 2), a new PDD (Version 07) was published 
on the UNFCCC website between 23 December 2011 and 21 January 2012 for 
another Global Stakeholder Process. This time, International Rivers submitted an 
official comment published on the website repeating the concerns of the earlier letter 
(International Rivers 2012. For the validation website see: 
(http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/Validation/DB/QFMTTATFT920BBVX9JOKGOIHX
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2ES5Y/view.html). The arguments were eventually rejected in SGS’s final validation 
report of October 2013, pointing out that Kamchay meets the additionality criteria and 
referring to the approval letters of the EIA and the Climate Change Departments (SGS 
2013: pp. 91-98 for additionality, and pp. 116-117 for a consideration of International 
Rivers’ submission). 
 
When the Kamchay Dam officially opened on 7 December 2011, Prime Minister Hun 
Sen presided over the opening ceremony. He argued that the environmental effects 
had been well studied and urged ‘“extreme environmentalists” to “look at the whole 
forest rather than each single tree”’, i.e. to evaluate the dam against positive effects on 
Cambodia’s high energy prices (AFP 2011). His comments mirrored remarks made at 
the ceremony to mark the first phase of operation of the dam on 7 December 2009: 
Kamchay would allow the government to scale back its annual subsidies of around 
USD20 million to reduce the cost of diesel-generated power (Cheang and Strangio 
2009). Kim Sovan, general affairs officer of Sinohydro Cambodia, said the dam 
would allow the government to reduce energy imports from neighbouring countries 
(Cheang 2007).  
 
Conversely, NGOs contested that the consultations resembled information meetings 
rather than open discussions (Interview P23092010). Sam Chanthy of the NGO 
Forum on Cambodia argued that consultations for the Initial EIA violated the legal 
requirements for public participation, thus rendering the project illegal (Vong and 
Strangio 2008). Chhith Sam Ath, executive director of the NGO Forum on Cambodia, 
emphasized the absence of a Full EIA and therefore the lack of information on the 
impact on the biodiversity of Bokor National Park. He also pointed to the fact that 
Sinohydro has not published the environmental management plan. In addition, he 
emphasized the lack of consultations by Sinohydro with affected communities 
(Cheang and Strangio 2009). A lack of adequate environmental and social safeguards 
were also emphasized in a January 2008 report by the Rivers Coalition in Cambodia, 
co-authored with International Rivers (International Rivers and Rivers Coalition in 
Cambodia 2008: 53).Thus, while Cambodian NGOs have been vocal in their 
resistance by citing environmental regulations, their main contender is MIME. The 
MoE is caught in the perceived dichotomy between environmental protection and 
development.  
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Conclusion 
As Cambodia is developing its hydropower basis, the central discursive elements 
show that proponents and opponents of hydropower argue from fundamentally 
different points of view. Institutionally, the MoE is in a weak position vis-à-vis 
MIME. This includes the prime minister’s full support for hydropower and his close 
links with economic leaders. Hun Sen’s criticism of environmental NGOs has been 
repeatedly sharp (Macan-Markar 2011), as seen during the inauguration ceremony for 
Kamchay. Indeed, for Kamchay, the EIA process was irrelevant to the construction 
decision or the construction process. The EIA framework lacks government 
ownership. It is not enforced, and the norm of environmental protection is not 
generally accepted in the government.  
 
Furthermore, the Climate Change Department had no role in the development of 
Kamchay, and the Full EIA was delayed until just before the opening of the dam. The 
dam’s local development effects are questionable as the energy is destined for Phnom 
Penh. Kamchay therefore links firmly with the government’s national-level 
development discourse. Indeed, having been approved by the prime minister during 
the Greater Mekong Subregion summit meeting with his Chinese counterpart, 
Kamchay was supported from the start by the political leadership with the aim to 
reduce electricity costs and meet rising electricity demand especially in the booming 
capital. 
 
Hydropower proponents emphasize the benefits of hydropower for national-level 
development and the potential of CDM to attract foreign investment while 
downplaying the environmental impact. CDM thus becomes part of the liberal 
investment policies, while EIA is disqualified as an obstacle to national development. 
In order to delegitimize the pro-hydropower discourse, NGOs establish EIA as a 
counter-norm, casting CDM as a smokescreen through which environmentally 
harmful projects are implemented. This is particularly prominent in the contention 
that the Kamchay Dam violates Cambodia’s EIA regulations. Cambodia’s MoE is 
caught within this contestation. It is vocal about the resistance of MIME to EIA and 
views large dams as climate friendly technology – thus it is not opposed to large dams 
on principled grounds. Indeed, it views environmental protection and development as 
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complementary and EIA as a mechanism to improve environmental sustainability. Yet, 
as a line ministry it has to comply with government priorities. While it should ensure 
the integrative nature of CDM and EIA, it is torn apart.  
 
Perhaps the most striking difference is that the micro-level policies pursued by the 
Climate Change Department indicate its view that sustainability begins at the local 
level. This stands in contrast to the belief held by the General Department of Energy 
that sustainability comes through national-level development. The diverging 
interpretation of CDM creates friction within the CDM norm and further fragments 
the field of environmental protection where normative cohesion should be expected. 
Furthermore, while MIME claims World Bank support, local NGOs link up with 
Probe International and International Rivers. Domestic norm contestation thus mirrors 
global norm contestation. 
 
Cambodia’s domestic actors therefore engage in a multitude of contestation processes. 
The overarching contest is one in which environmental protection and economic 
development, local sustainability and national sustainability, as well as different 
notions of sustainability (economic v. social and environmental) appear as mutually 
exclusive goals. Field fragmentation is therefore high, and the pursuit of contending 
norms produces an inability of actors to work together, thus creating a structure that is 
not conducive to cooperation. As the field becomes fragmented, the MoE loses its 
integrative function with respect to both norms, not so much because a normative 
conflict exists within the institution, but primarily because the Ministry is facing 
contending demands made upon it. By bringing field norms into the analysis, we can 
project the institution onto an organizational field in which different stakeholders 
adhere to different norms that affect the effectiveness of the institution, i.e. its ability 
to project its norms in political practice.   
 
The consequence is that, while the MoE was set up by ADB TAs funded by Northern 
donors, the expectation was that it would lead to a greening of the Cambodian state. 
Instead, this agenda was first ignored – evident in the problematic implementation of 
EIA – and then subverted when the CDM mechanism was installed in the MoE and, 
crucially, manipulated to become a functional part of MIME’s hydropower agenda as 
it was subjected to an inter-ministerial committee in which the real power lies with the 
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energy bureaucracy. As a consequence, Cambodian actors are not passive receivers on 
who the global normative order is inflicted. Instead, they are making active use of 
contending norms, thus engaging in a process in which they use and manipulate 
global norms for policy goals, applying contending definitions and interpretations. As 
norms are generic, they are fought over by local actors. Therefore, the relevance of 
global norms becomes understandable only by examining if and how global norms are 
actively inserted by local actors into their development discourses.   
 
Endnotes  
1
 For strategies to overcome fragmentation see for example Pache and Santos (2013). 
2
 These conflicts are embedded in competing ideas about the character of the environment: from a 
narrow technical notion (e.g. a river in terms of its hydrological characteristics that can be exploited for 
hydropower purposes) to a deep ecology (Plumwood 2002) and complex systems perspective in which 
the environment is cast as a social-ecological system (Walker et al. 2002). 
 
References 
Acharya, A. (2004) ‘How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization 
and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism’, International Organization 58: 
239-75. 
Acharya, A. (2009) Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
ADB (1994) Technical Assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia for Strengthening 
Environmental Impact Assessment Procedures and Capabilities, no place: ADB.  
ADB (1996) Technical Assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia for Institutional 
Strengthening and Expanding EIA Capacity, no place: ADB.  
ADB (1999) Technical Assistance Completion: Institutional Strengthening and 
Expanding EIA Capacity, no place: ADB.  
AFP (2011) ‘Cambodia Opens Controversial Mega-Dam’, 7 December 2011, 
http://phys.org/news/2011-12-cambodia-controversial-mega-dam.html.  
Allan, T. (2003) IWRM/IWRAM: A New Sanctioned Discourse? Occasional Paper 
50, SOAS Water Issues Studies Group, London: School of Oriental 
Studies/King’s College of London. 
Banerjee, B. (2003) ‘Who Sustains Whose Development? Sustainable Development 
and the Reinvention of Nature’, Organization Studies 24(2): 143-180. 
 25 
Battilana, J., and S. Dorado (2010) ‘Building Sustainable Hybrid Organizations: The 
Case of Commercial Microfinance Organizations’, Academy of Management 
Journal 53(6): 1419-1440. 
Burnell, P. (1997) ‘The Changing Politics of Foreign Aid: Where to Next?’, Politics 
17(2): 117-25. 
Buysman, E. and A. Mol (2013) ‘Market-based Biogas Sector Development in Least 
Developed Countries: The Case of Cambodia’, Energy Policy 63: 44-
51.Caminfoweb 2012. ‘Zhong zi cheng jian Ganzai shuidianzhan jungong fadian. 
Hong Sen zongli Pan Guangxue dashi deng chuxi qingdian yishi’ [Chinese-
invested and Chinese-built Kamchay Hydropower Station completed and 
producing electricity. Prime Minister Hun Sen and Ambassador Pan Guangxue 
attended the festive ceremony], 2 February, 
http://www.caminfoweb.com/ReadNews.asp?NewsId=1709. 
Cheang S. (2007) ‘Kampot Poised to Enter World of Hydroelectric Power’, Phnom 
Penh Post, 12-25 January, http://ki-media.blogspot.com/2007/01/locals-
concerned-about-building.html. 
Cheang, S. and S. Strangio (2009) ‘PM Opens Kamchay Dam’, Phnom Penh Post, 8 
December 2009, http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/pm-opens-kamchay-
dam.  
Checkel, J. (1997) ‘International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the 
Rationalist-Constructivist Divide’, European Journal of International Relations 
3(4): 473-95. 
Cortell, A. and J. Davis (1996) ‘How Do International Institutions Matter? The 
Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms’, International Studies 
Quarterly 40(4): 451-78.  
Council for the Development of Cambodia (2010) ‘The Price of Power’, Invest in 
Cambodia Magazine, www.investincambodia.com/power.htm.  
De Lopez, T. (2003) Assessing Cambodia’s Potential for Bio-Energy, Phnom Penh: 
Cambodian Research Centre for Development.  
De Lopez, T., P. Tin, K. Iyadomi, S. Santos and B. McIntosh (2009) ‘Clean 
Development Mechanism and Least Developed Countries: Changing the Rules 
for Greater Participation’, Journal of Environment and Development 18(4): 436-
452.  
 26 
Dyer, E. and S. Chun (2010) ‘Huadian Secures Financing for Hydropower Plant in 
Koh Kong,’ Phnom Penh Post, 19 July. 
Finnemore, M. (1996) National Interests in International Society, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press.  
Finnemore, M. and K. Sikkink (1998) ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change’, International Organization 52: 887-918.  
Goldstein, J. and R. Keohane (eds) (1993) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, 
Institutions, and Political Change, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
Greenwood, R., A. Magán Díaz, S. Xiao Li and J. Céspedes Lorente (2010) ‘The 
Multiplicity of Institutional Logics and the Heterogeneity of Organizational 
Responses’, Organization Sciences 21(2): 521-539. 
Greenwood, R., M. Raynard, F. Kodeih, E. Micelotta and M. Lounsbury (2011) 
‘Institutional Complexity and Organizational Responses’, Academy of 
Management Annals 5(1): 317-371. 
Gregg, B. (2003) Coping in Politics with Indeterminate Norms: A Theory of 
Enlightened Localism, Albany: SUNY Press. 
Grimsditch, M. (2012) China’s Investment in Hydropower in the Mekong Region: 
The Kamchay Hydropower Dam, Kampot, Cambodia, Washington DC: Bank 
Information Center.  
Grogan, K., S. Hansfort, P. van Beukering and K. van der Leeuw (2009) Reduced 
Emission from Deforestation and Degradation in the Southern Cardamom 
ecosystem, Cambodia, Amsterdam: Institute of Environmental Studies, VU 
University Amsterdam. 
Hayes, N. and R. Rajão (2011) ‘Competing Institutional Logics and Sustainable 
Development: The Case of Geographic Information Systems in Brazil’s Amazon 
Region’, Information Technology for Development 17(1): 4-23. 
Hughes, C. and S. Kim (with the assistance of S. Ann) (2004) The Evolution of 
Democratic Process and Conflict Management in Cambodia: A Comparative 
Study of Three Cambodian Elections, Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development 
Resources Institute.   
Hun Sen (2013) Opening Address at the 2013 Cambodia Outlook Conference: A 
Partnership of CDRI and ANZ Royal Bank ‘Securing Cambodia’s Future: Food, 
Energy and Natural Resources’, Phnom Penh, 20 February 2013, 
http://cnv.org.kh/en/?p=3475.  
 27 
International Rivers (2010) Letter to SGS Re Kamchay Hydroelectric BOT Project 
(Cambodia), http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/southeast-
asia/cambodia/letter-sgs-re-kamchay-hydroelectric-bot-project-cambodia 
International Rivers (2012) Comments to CF Carbon Fund II Limited Regarding the 
Kamchay Hydropower Project (Cambodia), 20 January 2012, 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/comments-to-cf-carbon-fund-ii-ltd-
regarding-the-kamchay-hydropower-project-cambodia-3059.  
International Rivers and Rivers Coalition in Cambodia (2008) Cambodia’s 
Hydropower Development and China’s Involvement, no place: International 
Rivers and Rivers Coalition in Cambodia. 
Jung, M. (2006) ‘Host Country Attractiveness for CDM Non-Sink Projects’, Energy 
Policy 34: 2173. 
Kay, K. (2006) ‘High Hopes for New Economic Zone in S’Ville’, Cambodia Daily, 
30 November, http://ki-media.blogspot.com/2006/12/high-hopes-for-new-
economic-zone-in.html. 
Keck, M. and K. Sikkink (1998) Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
Labelle, H. (1997) ‘CIDA Responds to Probe’s 1996 Mekong Campaign’, Probe 
International, 29 January, 
http://www.probeinternational.org/catalog/content_fullstory.php?contentId=221
2&cat_id=21. 
Le Billon, P. (2000), ‘The Political Ecology of Transition in Cambodia 1989-1999: 
War, Peace and Forest Exploitation’, Development and Change 31: 785-805. 
Lounsbury, M. (2007) ‘A Tale of Two Cities: Competing logics and Practice 
Variation in the Professionalizing of Mutual Funds’, Academy of Management 
Journal 50(2): 289-307. 
Macan-Markar, M. (2011) ‘Chinese Dams Challenge Western Development 
Monopoly’, Inter Press Service, 10 January, 
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=54068.   
Malmquist, P. and M. Sigfridsson (2002) The Kamchay Hydropower Project: 
Hydropower Development in Cambodia and Eastern Asia, no place and 
publisher, 
http://dspace.mah.se:8080/bitstream/2043/1087/1/TheKamchayProject.pdf. 
 28 
McPherson, C. and M. Sauder (2013) ‘Logics in Action: Managing Institutional 
Complexity in a Drug Court’, Administrative Science Quarterly 58(2): 165-196. 
Mullins, D. (2006) ‘Competing Institutional Logics? Local Accountability and Scale 
and Efficiency in an Expanding Non-Profit Housing Sector’, Public Policy and 
Administration 21(3): 6-24. 
Orenstein, M. (2008) Privatizing Pensions: The Transnational Campaign for Social 
Security Reform, Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Ministry of Environment (no date_a) Climate Change Department: History, 
http://www.camclimate.org.kh/index.php/ccd/history.html. 
Ministry of Environment (no date_b) National Climate Change Committee: Roles and 
Functions, http://www.camclimate.org.kh/index.php/policies/roles-and-
functions.html.  
Ministry of Environment (no date_c) National Climate Change Committee: Structure, 
http://www.camclimate.org.kh/index.php/policies/the-nccc-structure.html.  
Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Planning (2012) 
The Cambodian Government’s Achievements and Future Direction in 
Sustainable Development: National Report for Rio+2, Phnom Penh: Ministry of 
Environment, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Planning. 
NGO Forum on Cambodia and Probe International (2009) Powering 21
st
 Century 
Cambodia with Decentralized Generation: A Primer for Rethinking Cambodia’s 
Electricity Future, Phnom Penh: NGO Forum on Cambodia and Probe 
International.  
Paavola, J. (2007) ‘Institutions and Environmental Governance: A 
Reconceptualization’, Ecological Economics 63(1): 93-103. 
Pache, A. and F. Santos (2013) ‘Inside the Hybrid Organization: Selective Coupling 
as a Response to Competing Institutional Logics’, Academy of Management 
Journal 56(4): 972-1001. 
Pak, K., V. Horng, N. Eng, S. Ann, S. Kim, J. Knowles and D. Craig (2007), 
Accountability and Neo-Patrimonialism in Cambodia: A Critical Literature 
Review. Working Paper 34, Phnom Penh: CDRI. 
Plumwood, V. (2002) Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason, 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
Poch, K. (2013) ‘Renewable Energy Development in Cambodia: Status, Prospects and 
Policies’, in S. Kimura, H. Phoumin and B. Jacobs (eds) Energy Market 
 29 
Integration in East Asia: Renewable Energy and its Deployment into the Power 
System. ERIA Research Project Report 2012-26, Jakarta: ERIA, pp. 227-266. 
Reay, T. and C. Hinings (2009), ‘Managing the Rivalry of Competing Institutional 
Logics’, Organization Studies 30(4): 629-652.  
Risse, T. and K. Sikkink (1999) ‘The Socialization of International Human Rights 
Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction’, in T. Risse, S. Ropp and K. 
Sikkink (eds) The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic 
Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-38. 
Royal Government of Cambodia (1994) Law on Investment of the Kingdom of 
Cambodia, Phnom Penh: Royal Government of Cambodia. 
Royal Government of Cambodia (1996) Law on Environmental Protection and 
Natural Resources Management, Phnom Penh: Royal Government of Cambodia.  
Royal Government of Cambodia (1999) Sub-decree on Environmental Impact 
Assessment Process, Phnom Penh: Royal Government of Cambodia.  
Royal Government of Cambodia (2009) Prakas on General Guideline for Conducting 
Initial and Full Environmental Impact Assessment Reports, Phnom Penh: Royal 
Government of Cambodia. 
Royal Government of Cambodia (2010) National Strategic Development Plan Update 
2009-2013, Phnom Penh: Royal Government of Cambodia. 
Sam, C. (no date – publication after November 2005) Scoping Study of Existing 
Frameworks Related to the World Commission on Dams Strategic Framework – 
Cambodia. Study prepared for the IUCN-World Conversation Union project to 
support the dissemination of the WCD Strategic Priorities.  
Sam, C. (2007) The Kamchay Hydroelectric Dam, Phnom Penh: NGO Forum on 
Cambodia.  
Santa-Cruz, A. (2009) ‘Contested Compliance in a Liberal Normative Structure: The 
Western Hemisphere Idea and the Monitoring of the Mexican Elections’, 
Contested Norms in International Law and International Relations 5(1): 49-92.  
Santos, B. and C. Rodriguez-Garavito (2005) ‘Law, Politics and the Subaltern in 
Counter-Hegemonic Globalization’, in Santos, B. and C. Rodriguez-Garavito 
(eds.) Law and Globalization from below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-26. Selznick, P. (1957) 
Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation, Evanston: Row and 
Peterson. 
 30 
SGS (2013) Validation Report: CF Carbon Fund II Limited, Kamchay Hydroelectric 
BOT Project, London: SGS. 
Sinohydro (2008) Clean Development Mechanism Project Design Document for 
Kamchay Hydroelectric BOT Project, Version 01, 12 July. 
Sinohydro (2011) Clean Development Mechanism Project Design Document for 
Kamchay Hydroelectric BOT Project, Version 07, 1
 
December. 
Sinohydro (2013) Clean Development Mechanism Project Design Document for 
Kamchay Hydroelectric BOT Project, Version 15, 14 August.  
Sokhem, P. and K. Sunada (2006) ‘The Governance of the Tonle Sap Lake, Cambodia: 
Integration of Local, National and International Levels’, International Journal of 
Water Resources Development 22(3): 399-416. 
Springer, S. (2005), ‘The Neoliberal “Order” in Cambodia: Political Violence, 
Democracy, and the Contestation of Public Space’, paper presented at the 
conference of the Canadian Council for Southeast Asian Studies, York 
University, 
http://www.yorku.ca/ycar/CCSEAS%20Papers/Simon%20Springer%20Paper.pd
f.  
Sneddon, C. (2007) ‘Nature’s Materiality and the Circuitous Paths of Accumulation: 
Dispossession of Freshwater Fisheries in Cambodia’, Antipode 39(1): 167-93. 
Stinchcombe, A. (1968) Constructing Social Theories, Chicago: Chicago University 
Press.  
Swan, J., M. Bresnen, M. Robertson, S. Newell and S. Dopson (2010) ‘When Policy 
meets Practice: Colliding Logics and the Challenges of ‘Mode 2’ Initiatives in 
the Translation of Academic Knowledge’, Organization Studies 31(9-10): 1311-
1340. 
Tin, P., with contributions from B. McIntosh and T. de Lopez (2004) Climate Change 
and the Clean Development Mechanism, Phnom Penh: Cambodian Research 
Centre for Development.   
Un, K. and S. So (2009) ‘Politics of Natural Resource Use in Cambodia’, Asian 
Affairs: An American Review 36(3): 123-38. 
Vit, G. (2011) ‘Competing Logics: Project Failure in Gaspesia’, European 
Management Journal 29(3): 234-244. 
Vong S. and S. Strangio (2008) ‘High Hopes for Hydropower’, Phnom Penh Post, 29 
May, http://angkor.com/2bangkok/2bangkok/forum/showthread.php?p=26857.  
 31 
Walker, B., S. Carpenter, J. Anderies, N. Abel, G. Cumming, M. Janssen, L. Lebel, J. 
Norberg, G. Peterson, and R. Pritchard (2002) ‘Resilience Management in Social-
ecological Systems: A Working Hypothesis for a Participatory Approach,’ 
Conservation Ecology 6(1), online at 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol6/iss1/art14/.  
Williamson, A. (2006) ‘Sustainable Energy Policy Reform in Cambodia’, in K. 
Mallon (ed) Renewable Energy Policy and Politics: A Handbook for Decision-
Making, London: Earthscan.  
Williamson, A., with contributions from B. McIntosh, T. de Lopez and P. Tin (2004) 
Sustainable Energy in Cambodia: Status and Assessment of the Potential for 
Clean Development Mechanism Projects, Phnom Penh: Cambodian Research 
Centre for Development.  
Xinhua (2011) ‘Cambodia’s Largest Hydroelectric Dam Begins Operation’, 7 
December, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/xinhua/2011-12-
07/content_4607116.html.  
